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Abstract—The management of identities on the Internet has
evolved from the traditional approach (where each service
provider stores and manages identities) to a federated identity
management system (where the identity management is delegated
to a set of identity providers). On the one hand, federated identity
ensures usability and provides economic benefits to service
providers. On the other hand, it poses serious privacy threats
to users as well as service providers. The current technology,
which is prevalently deployed on the Internet, allows identity
providers to track the user’s behavior across a broad range of
services.
In this work, we propose PRIMA, a universal credential-
based authentication system for supporting federated identity
management in a privacy-preserving manner. Basically, PRIMA
does not require any interaction between service providers
and identity providers during the authentication process, thus
preventing identity providers to profile users’ behavior. Moreover,
throughout the authentication process, PRIMA provides a mech-
anism for controlled disclosure of the users’ private information.
We have conducted comprehensive evaluations of the system to
show the feasibility of our approach. Our performance analysis
shows that an identity provider can process 1,426 to 3,332
requests per second when the key size is varied from 1024 to
2048-bit, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication is an essential step that aims at accurately
identifying the user making a request. Traditionally, identities
of users were managed separately by each service provider.
Such a traditional approach is not only impractical for service
providers (i.e., requiring additional management burden), but
is also bad from the users’ point of view (i.e., they have to
manage different credentials for different services).
Federated identity enables users to use the same identity
across several services. Today, many service providers have
adopted the concept of federated identity due to its eco-
nomic advantages and usability benefits. For service providers,
federated identity offers a replacement of standard identity
management services; while, for the users, it simplifies the
authentication across multiple services, i.e., they do not have
to remember a pair of user name and password for each service
they consume.
One of commonly used federated identity management
solutions is OpenID [1] – an open standard – adopted by over
one million websites for over one billion OpenID enabled user
accounts [2]. Typically, the OpenID infrastructure consists of
two main entities, an identity provider and a service provider.
The identity provider is responsible for user registration and
management of OpenID accounts, while the service provider
offers OpenID-enabled services, which can authenticate users
based on their OpenID accounts. Using a single OpenID
account, users are able to authenticate to multiple service
providers. After a user is registered with an OpenID provider,
she can consume services offered by OpenID-enabled service
providers, which can let users authenticate using their OpenID
credentials, instead of creating and managing new identities.
For authenticating the requesting user, the service provider
forwards the request to the identity provider. After the au-
thentication, the identity provider sends a signed confirmation
to the user. The user forwards this signed confirmation to
the service provider, which can finally authenticate the user.
The OpenID Connect [3] – an extension of OpenID that
incorporates OAuth 2.0 [4] – enables authorization besides
user authentication. More specifically, users choose a piece of
personal information a service provider can get access to.
Although the OpenID Connect promises a great deal of
usability by offering both authentication and authorization, it
puts the privacy of users in danger. In all federated identity
management solutions (including OpenID, OAuth and OpenID
Connect), an identity provider is contacted every time a user
visits any service provider, which implies that users’ activities
are unnecessarily logged by identity providers. A curious
identity provider could easily profile the users and sell this
private data to third-parties, thus invading the privacy of users.
Our Contribution. In this work, we present PRIMA, a
privacy-preserving federated login, which offers advantages in
terms of ensuring privacy. PRIMA is deployable and efficient
at Internet-scale. To assist the design of PRIMA, we propose a
modified version of the cryptographic construction presented
in Oblivion [5], assuring minimal exposure of private data and
scalability.
In this work, we aim at preserving the privacy of users by
modifying the way federated identity management solutions
work. In the system we propose, an identity provider issues
credentials to users after the registration. Users store locally
and use these credentials when they want to consume services,
without requiring any interaction with identity providers. Our
approach ensures not only users’ privacy but also prevents
unnecessary interaction between service providers and identity
providers. Without loss of generality, PRIMA enables users
to have full control over information shared with service
providers, i.e., allowing users to grant or revoke access at any
time. Even more, to preserve privacy and to support several
real world scenarios, PRIMA introduces an inference engine
for generating attribute specific proofs. More specifically, the
inference engine generates proofs that prove the possession of
a particular attribute without disclosing private information.
Moreover, a service provider cannot learn more than what is
required or permitted by the user. The cryptographic technique
we use is such that a service provider can verify an arbitrary
number of attributes with merely a single verification.
II. MOTIVATING SCENARIOS
Let us consider two real world scenarios that require au-
thentication, namely an online bank and an online cinema.
The first scenario, i.e., an online bank, requires a full disclo-
sure of Personally Identifiable Information (PII); whereas, the
online cinema has to verify only the age of the user and the
geographical location.
Online banking - Full disclosure of PII. Consider a user
who wants to open a bank account with an online bank. Instead
of going in person to identify herself, the user wants to use her
federated login issued by an authority, i.e., identity provider.
For an opening account request to be lawful, the bank needs to
get the full data of the user including her full name and current
address. In such a scenario, the user has to disclose almost all
of her private information required by the bank to be able to
use the federated login for accessing her bank account.
Online Cinema - Minimal disclosure. In our second sce-
nario, we consider a user who wants to access online services
that do not require PII, but rather a proof that the user is over
a certain age and is not a robot (is a human). In order to access
the service, instead of disclosing her personal information, to
preserve her privacy, she wants to provide only proof that she
is over the age required for the selected movie, and that she
is registered with some authority.
III. DESIGN OVERVIEW
A. System Entities
Our design does not require any additional entity, i.e., we
only rely on entities that are inherently present in the legacy
infrastructure, namely an identity provider, a service provider
and a user.
Identity Provider (IdP). It is responsible for issuing (or
revoking) credentials to the users. These credentials are issued
after a certain policy of the IdP is fulfilled. This policy might
include a verification of users’ attributes, i.e., determining
whether the user is associated with the identity, which could
be accomplished out-of-band.
Service Provider (SP). These are entities that allow users
access to particular services. The approval of the users’ access
may depend on the certified attributes they receive from the
user. A trust relation between the SP and the IdP has to be in
place for the users to be eligible to use the IdP for accessing
the SP.
User (U). On the one hand, users are consumers of the service
provided by the SP. On the other hand, they are provider of
knowledge – by disclosing their private information to IdPs
and SPs.
The basic workflow we consider within this paper is as
follows. The user contacts the SP to consume some of its
services. The SP protects its resources and authorizes only
legitimate (i.e., registered) users. To this end, the SP does not
deploy its authentication management system but instead relies
on a mechanism supported by federated identity. To use the
federated identity, the user has to register with an IdP (only
if she is not already registered), get her attributes certified by
the IdP, and finally use them to authenticate with the SP.
B. System Goals
The main focus of our system is to provide federated
authentication while protecting the users’ privacy, such that
the IdP cannot correlate the authentication request to the
destination SP. More specifically, the IdP cannot profile the
user’s online behavior by tracking the authentication requests.
Profile unlinkability. The IdP should not be able to correlate
the authentication requests to the corresponding users. In other
words, the IdP should not be able to profile the user’s behavior.
Selective disclosure. A service provider should not learn
anything beyond the information that is required for providing
the service. In some cases, this information might be required
for eligibility checking, e.g., age requirement.
Non-impersonation. The non-impersonation property re-
quires that no one except the user who is in a possession
of a secret can be authorized. Evermore, the IdP should also
not be able to impersonate its users.
Deployability. The system is required to be deployable
from a technical perspective. Given the extensive deployed
federated identity solutions (i.e., OpenID and SAML), the
systems should be incrementally deployable as a complement
to the existing infrastructure.
Non-Goals. We do not aim at providing anonymous creden-
tials like [6]. Our IdP is trusted and has a full knowledge of
the users’ PII. However, our system supports “weak” variant
of anonymous credentials. The IdP can issue an authentication
token for the requesting user without disclosing any of her
PII. For instance, if the service provider requests a proof
that the consumer of its services is located in a particular
country, then the IdP can be instructed to generate a valid
authentication token disclosing only one a single attribute
which is the country of residence.
C. Threat Model
We consider the threat model as considered in the OpenID
protocol [7]. We aim to achieve aforementioned goals without
changing the current infrastructure. Our adversary has a full
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Fig. 1. PRIMA: By providing her attributes (Step 1a), a user gets registered with an Identity Provider (IdP) by receiving signed attributes (Step 1b). Later,
a user can visit a Service Provider (SP) that trusts the IdP. To authenticate to the SP, the user interacts with the SP (Step 2a) and receives a set of requested
attributes (Step 2b). To show that her identity is valid, she asks the IdP to sign the nonce, which could be received from the SP (Step 2c). After the validity
check, the IdP signs the nonce and sends it back to the user (Step 2d). Finally, she forwards the signed nonce back to the SP along with her digital credential
(Step 2e). The SP approves her access (Step 2f).
access to the network resources between the communicating
parties and he can eavesdrop any of the communicated data.
We consider the IdP to be honest-but-curious, meaning it
is honest to issue or revoke credentials but curious to profile
the users’ behavior. We do not fully trust the SP. We assume
a malicious SP that (1) wants to benefit from the user’s
data and (2) reuse the user’s attributes or session cookies
to authenticate. Finally, we assume that a user space is not
compromized.
D. Key Idea
The key idea is to use credential-based authentication
without direct communication and data exchange between the
IdP and the SP during the authentication process. The IdP
issues a unique digital assertion that carries digital information,
i.e., attributes about the user’s identity. To achieve the mini-
mal disclosure requirement defined in the system goals, our
system relies on the cryptographic construction for controlled
disclosure of the attributes proposed in Oblivion [5]. Using this
construction, the authenticating user can prove possession of
the identity by disclosing a minimal set of required attributes.
Since the attributes are issued without specifying a particular
service and can be verified without interaction with the IdP, all
the requests are undetectable for the IdP. We define the digital
credential dID issued by the IdP to be a tuple of the form.
dID = 〈A,σA,vkU ,T 〉 (1)
where A = {a1,a2, . . . ,an} is a list of the user’s attributes
(where an attribute could be a user name or her address),
σA = {σa1 ,σa2 , . . . ,σan} is a list of signed attributes, vkU is
the verification key for verifying messages signed by the user,
and T = {tisu, texp} is a set of time values that define the issuing
(tisu) and the expiration date (texp).
IV. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
Figure 1 presents the proposed architecture to achieve the
aforementioned goals. Our system consists of two phases,
namely registration and authentication. The registration phase
is generally a one-time step when the user signs up (i.e.,
opens an account) with the IdP. This phase could also be
accomplished out-of-band. During the authentication phase,
the user proves her eligibility to use the service provided by
the SP. In the following, we describe the sequence of events
that the user has to follow in order to authenticate with the
SP.
• (U → IdP): Figure 1 Step 1a
The user U registers with the identity provider IdP by
providing a set of her (n) attributes A = {a1,a2, . . . ,an}
along with her verification key vkU . Each attribute ai ∈
A is a pair 〈KEY, VALUE〉, representing name of the
attribute and value specific to each user, respectively.
• (IdP →U): Figure 1 Step 1b
Upon a successful verification of the provided attributes,
the IdP issues a list of (n) signed attributes σA =
{σa1 ,σa2 , . . . ,σan} and sends it back in the form of a
digital credential (dID) to the requesting user. We employ
the attribute signing scheme presented in Oblivion [5] and
bind every attribute with the verification key of the user
and an expiration date. More formally, for each attribute
ai ∈ A, the IdP computes:
σai = Sign(skIdP,ai||vkU ||texp)
where Sign is a signing algorithm and || denotes concate-
nation.
• (U → SP): Figure 1 Step 2a
Once the user is in possession of authentication creden-
tials, she can send a request for consuming a service to
an SP that supports credential-based authentication. The
user requests access providing her unique ID (i.e., her
verification key vkU ).
• (SP →U): Figure 1 Step 2b
The SP responds with a credential request and a fresh
nonce, requesting a set of user’s attributes A∗. Depending
on the service that the SP offers, the set of requested
attributes could vary from a simple unique identification
to fine-grained attributes, such as date of birth, location
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Fig. 2. Inference engine: To request a service from the SP, the user interacts with the SP (Step 1a) and receives a set of required attributes (Step 1b). To
protect her privacy, she asks the IdP to transform the attributes into logical proofs such that the selected criteria are fulfilled (Step 2a). The IdP checks the
attributes, transforms them into logical proofs, signs them accordingly (Step 2b), and sends them back to the user (Step 2c). Finally, she forwards the signed
attributes back to the SP along with her digital credential (Step 3a). The SP approves her access (Step 3b).
and biometric attributes.
• (U → IdP): Figure 1 Step 2c
To prove that the user’s account is actual (i.e., neither
blocked or revoked), the user needs to get a signed nonce
from the IdP. One the nonce is received from the SP, she
contacts the IdP on the fly to request a signature on the
nonce.
• (IdP →U): Figure 1 Step 2d
The IdP checks the status of the user account, and once
verified that the account is valid, it signs the nonce and
sends it back to the user.
• (U → SP): Figure 1 Step 2e
Finally, upon receiving the signed nonce, the user
sends to the SP her digital credential, dID∗ =〈
A∗,PσA∗ ,vkU ,T S,sID
〉
, where PσA∗ is a packed signature
of (requested) attributes A∗, along with a signature σdID∗
over the dID∗ and the signed nonce. For preventing replay
attacks, a timestamp T S and a session sID is included in
the message.
• (SP →U): Figure 1 Step 2f
Upon receiving the credential dID∗, the SP verifies it
before authorizing the user. First, it verifies the signature
σdID∗ over the dID∗. Next, it checks if the authentication
session and time values are correct. Finally, the SP
verifies the attributes and the validity of the packed
signature. After a successful verification, the SP issues
an authorization token for the requesting user.
Upon a successful completion of the authentication phase,
the user is authorized by the SP and receives an access token
or a cookie. The expiration policy of the credentials whether
they are in a form of access token or a cookie are out of the
scope of this work. Every time the user requests access to the
SP, she has to go over the authentication steps.
V. INFERENCE ENGINE
In order to support real world scenarios presented in Sec-
tion II (say the second scenario), and preserve privacy of the
users, we introduce a new module named inference engine.
This module is in charge of transforming the real users’
attributes into a logical proof that shows possessing of the
attributes without disclosing their real value. To explain the
importance of such a module, in the following, we present the
simple scenario from the Section II from the perspective of
the inference engine (Figure 2).
The user, say Alice, visits online cinema (say, OnlineKino)
in order to watch a movie. OnlineKino asks Alice to prove that
she is over 16 and to provide her country of residence in order
to be able to watch the selected movie. Alice receives a list of
all required attributes from OnlineKino along with a nonce (in
this case the age attribute, and country). Alice chooses to use
her IdP and would provide authorization to OnlineKino to use
the required set of attributes. After Alice is authenticated with
her IdP and after the IdP of Alice receives authorization, Alice
decides to give temporary access to the following attributes:
• Proof that Alice is over 16
• Country
On her confirmation, the IdP generates an ID token bound
with a nonce (initially generated by the SP). Finally, Alice
sends the token back to the SP. After the verification by the
SP, she gets access to the requested movie. Note that the
communication between the IdP and the SP is made through
Alice.
Figure 2 presents a sequence of events that the protocol has
to follow in order to answer the request from the users for
issuing the requested proof.
• (U → SP): Figure 2 Step 1a
The user sends her request to the SP for consuming a
service. Same as in Figure 1, the user sends her ID along
with the request.
• (SP →U): Figure 2 Step 1b
The SP responds with an attributes request message,
requesting a set of user’s attributes.
• (U → IdP): Figure 2 Step 2a
The user asks her IdP to certify the set of attributes A.
If Alice is willing to blind some of the attributes to only
show that a condition is met, such as certain age, she
requests this transformation from the IdP.
• (IdP): Figure 2 Step 2b
The IdP activates its inference module to generate a proof
for the user’s attributes.
(i) Initially, the module checks the existence of the at-
tributes.
(ii) When privacy of the attributes is requested by the user,
the module transforms the attributes from their original
form into a logical proof that the selected criteria are
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Fig. 3. Performance overhead of (a) packing attributes, (b) verifying attributing and (c) verifying user requests.
fulfilled. For example, if the user is requesting a proof
that she is over a certain age without disclosing the
current age, the module generates a statement (e.g.,
Alice is over 16).
(iii) Finally, such transformation in a form of a statement
is signed by the IdP.
• (IdP →U): Figure 2 Step 2c
The IdP sends the certified attributes to the user.
• (U → SP): Figure 2 Step 3a
The user receives the request and responds with a packed
signature of attributes PσA∗ , where A
∗ is the set of the
requested attributes. Finally, the user forwards her digital
credential along with the certified attributes to the SP.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50
Ti
m
e 
(in
 se
co
nd
s)
Number of attributes certified
1024-bit Key
2048-bit Key
Fig. 4. Performance overhead of certifying attributes.
We provide an experimental demo implementation and
subsequently evaluate the performance overhead for all the
entities in the system. The implementation prototype is written
in Java and run on a standard notebook with 2.7 GHz Intel
core processor and 8 GB RAM running Windows 7 Enterprise
(64-bit).
IdP: Certifying User Attributes. One part of the registration
phase is the certification, i.e., signing of the users’ attributes.
Figure 4 illustrates the computational overhead for the signing
algorithm. For the experiment, we generated up to 50 attributes
with varying size of the signing key. On average, the IdP
takes 2.64 and 18.92 milliseconds (ms) per attribute for
1024 and 2048-bit keys, respectively. The certification time
grows linearly in the number of attributes. The registration
phase usually is a one-time activity per user; therefore, this
computational overhead is acceptable.
U: Packing Attributes. Figure 3(a) shows the computational
overhead of packing attributes on the user’s side. We observe
that the time taken by the packing algorithm increases linearly
with increase in the number of attributes, with an additional
overhead for larger key sizes. For 50 attributes, it took between
0.19 ms (for a 1024-bit key) and 0.62 ms (for a 2048-bit key).
SP: Verifying Attributes and Requests. Next, we measured
the rate at which an IdP can verify attributes. Figure 3(b)
shows that for verifying 50 attributes, the SP takes 0.67 ms
and 1.53 ms for 1024-bit and 2048-bit keys, respectively.
Finally, Figure 3(c) shows the efficiency of the authen-
tication phase. Assuming that every authentication request
requires 20 attributes1, and gradually increasing the number of
user requests from 2,000 to 20,000, we observed an essentially
linearly-growing overhead. On average, an IdP can process
3,332 and 1,426 requests per second for 1024-bit and 2048-
bit keys, respectively.
VII. DISCUSSION
It is known that the growing number of online services
make the traditional approach for authentication and identity
management infeasible. To solve this issue, federated identity
is a desirable feature, not only for users but also for service
providers. However, we believe that the privacy aspect has yet
to be considered when designing new or upgrading current
identity management solutions.
In this work, we proposed a universal credential-based
authentication system for supporting federated identity man-
agement in a privacy-preserving and efficient manner. Our
approach prevents identity providers from profiling the users’
behavior and also gives users full control over their private
attributes shared with service providers. Finally, we showed
that the system we propose is efficient and scalable, and can
be deployed today.
An alternative solution to achieve privacy in the currently
deployed infrastructure is to modify the traditional identity and
access management protocols to ensure unlinkability between
the service provider and the identity provider. To this end,
we suggest that users should receive the request from the
service provider. Before forwarding this request to the identity
1We assume a worst-case scenario with a disclosure of 20 private
attributes.
provider, the user should strip off the service provider specific
information from the request. After receiving the response
from the identity provider, the user can forward it to the service
provider. Without loss of generality, the identity provider can
use the inference engine to generate request proofs.
VIII. RELATED WORK
There are a number of initiatives in the EU concern-
ing privacy in identity management [8], [9], where pseudo-
identities [10] and anonymous credentials [11] are the under-
lying techniques. On one hand, anonymous credentials allow
users to perform offline authentication, i.e., without requiring
interaction with the identity provider. On the other hand, it
is challenging to do revocation due to offline nature of issued
credentials. Unfortunately, anonymous credentials face serious
scalability issues when it comes to revocation.
Bertino et al. [12] present an approach to the verify digital
identities for cloud platforms. However, they do leave unlink-
ability and delegatable authentication problems as open. Both
issues have been addressed by Chow et al. in [13]. However,
we argue that the scheme used in [13] is based on Identity-
Based Encryption (IBE) [14] that presents challenges when it
comes to revocation.
PseudoId [15] is a prototype of a protocol that protects users
from disclosure of private login data possessed by the identity
providers. It utilizes blind digital signatures to protect user’s
real identity. While this protocol is designed to be one-way,
and unlinkable federated login system, it does not support
selective disclosure of private data neither linking between
the users’ information and their identities, thus limiting its
usability to only limited scenarios.
Ardagna et al. [16] propose an extension of XACML and
SAML to achieve privacy-preserving access control. Similar
to our solution, they assume that the identity provider has a
complete knowledge of users’ attributes and the requester can
selectively disclose his attributes. Unlike our protocol, they
use anonymous credentials for protecting the users’ privacy.
In order to overcome the privacy issues with respect to the
cloud providers, Nunez et al. integrate proxy re-encryption
into OpenId and SAML [17], [18]. The latter one, Blin-
dIdM is a privacy-preserving realization for IDaaS (Identity
Management as a Service). In their proposal, they do not
fully outsource the identity management system, but instead
they keep the authentication at the host organization that
encrypts the users’ identity information before outsourcing to
the identity provider.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We proposed PRIMA, a universal credential-based authen-
tication system for supporting federated identity management
in a privacy-preserving manner. PRIMA does not require
any interaction between the identity provider and the service
provider, thus preventing active profiling of the users. More-
over, throughout the authentication process, PRIMA provides
a mechanism for controlled disclosure of the users’ private
information and mechanism for building logical proofs for
certain tributes without disclosing their real value. Finally,
we conducted comprehensive evaluations of the system to
show the feasibility of our approach. Our performance analysis
showed that an identity provider can process 1,426 to 3,332
requests per second when the key size varies from 1024 to
2048-bit, respectively.
As future work, we plan to make a user study about the us-
ability of the proposed system and formalize the corresponding
security and privacy definitions.
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